Wireless Internet Searches: How the Fourth Amendment Applies to Police Searches of Information Accessed over a Wireless Internet Connection by Hobin, Taylor
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 41
Number 3 Spring 2014 Article 6
1-1-2014
Wireless Internet Searches: How the Fourth
Amendment Applies to Police Searches of
Information Accessed over a Wireless Internet
Connection
Taylor Hobin
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Taylor Hobin, Wireless Internet Searches: How the Fourth Amendment Applies to Police Searches of Information Accessed over a Wireless
Internet Connection, 41 Hastings Const. L.Q. 681 (2014).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol41/iss3/6
Wireless Internet Searches: How the Fourth
Amendment Applies to Police Searches of




In January 2010, the United States District Court for the District
of Oregon ruled that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
iTunes files that are accessed over an unsecured wireless Internet
connection because the broadcasted information was openly
accessible to the public (Ahrndt I).' In doing so, it became the first
United States court to rule that the government can seize information
broadcast over an unencrypted wireless Internet connection without a
warrant. However, this was merely where the confusion began
relative to analyzing wireless Internet searches. In April 2012, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the decision
for further consideration (Ahrndt II).' In response to the Ninth
Circuit, the district court reversed its opinion and, in a decision
published in January 2013, concluded that the Fourth Amendment
had been violated (Ahrndt III).4 Taken together, these rulings
suggest that a person may not have an expectation of privacy in some
computer files that are accessible through a secured, or even an
unsecured, wireless network. This Note will use the reasoning in the
* J.D. Candidate 2014, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I
would like to extend a special thank you to UC Hastings Professor Aaron Rappaport for
his guidance on this Note.
1. United States v. Ahrndt (Ahrndt 1), No. 08-468-KI, 2010 WL 373994, at *5 (D.
Or. Jan. 28, 2010).
2. Id.
3. United States v. Ahmdt (Ahrndt II), 475 F. App'x 656 (9th Cir. 2012).
4. United States v. Ahrndt (Ahrndt III), No. 3:08-CR-00468-KI, 2013 WL 179326,
at *11 (D. Or. Jan. 17, 2013).
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three Ahrndt decisions' to create a framework for analyzing the
Fourth Amendment's application to secured and unsecured wireless
Internet networks.
A secured wireless network and an unsecured wireless network
may or may not be treated differently under the law.' Initially, one
might assume that a person has a greater expectation of privacy in
information that is accessed over a secured wireless network than
over an unsecured network. However, this issue may depend on how
a court interprets the way secured wireless networks operate.' If a
court follows an interpretation that securing wireless networks is
similar to locking a message in a briefcase or a sealed envelope, then
the court will likely find that there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy to the information.! This is because the United States
Supreme Court has a long history of finding a reasonable expectation
of privacy in items locked in containers.o However, if a court follows
an interpretation that securing wireless communications with an
encryption is similar to encoding a message before broadcasting it,
then the court will likely find that there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy to the information." This is because the Supreme Court
has long held that messages encoded and broadcast in the public do
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy and do not require a
warrant to capture and decode. 2 This Note argues that the court's
attempts to distinguish a secured network from an unsecured network
highlight the inconsistencies in analyzing wireless networks under a
traditional Katz analysis. 3 This note suggests that a Jones trespass
analysis would establish a more predictable and functional standard. 4
5. Ahrndt I; Ahrndt II; Ahrndt III.
6. See Orin Kerr, Do Users of Wi-Fi Networks Have Fourth Amendment Rights






10. See Georgetown Law Journal Annual Review of Criminal Procedure,
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. REv. CRIM. PROC. 37 (2006).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
14. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
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I. Background Information
A. The Wireless Internet Network
In recent years wireless Internet, or "Wi-Fi," has become the
standard mode of Internet connection." A wireless connection
operates by broadcasting radio waves from an Internet router,
replacing the need for computers to have a physical wired connection
in order to access the Internet." The government made specified
radio frequencies available to private companies for the purpose of
developing wireless Internet technology for the public, and these
specified bands are still the frequencies used today." The waves use
"spread spectrum" technology, originally developed for military use,
which spreads a radio signal over a wide range of frequencies, in
contrast to the usual approach of transmitting on a single, well-
defined frequency." This makes the signal less susceptible to
interference and creates a zone around the router that gives the user
wireless access to the Internet.'9 A typical router will create a circular
zone of approximately one hundred feet around the router in which
wireless connection to the Internet is made possible.20
A user's wireless Internet network can be left unsecured." An
unsecured network is not password protected, so a person within
range of the router can access the Internet wirelessly through that
router by selecting the network on their computer.22 Furthermore, an
unsecured network broadcasts unencrypted information and, if the
signal is intercepted, it is possible to view certain files on other's
computers if the person who intercepts the signal has proper
software.? As is the case in the Ahrndt decisions discussed infra, it is
possible for two strangers connected to the same network to view






20. Mitchell, Bradley, What is the Typical Range of Wi-Fi LAN?, ABOUT.COM,
http://compnetworking.about.com/cs/wirelessproducts/f/wifirange.htm (last visited Mar. 3,
2014).
21. See, e.g., Microsoft Safety and Security Center, http://www.microsoft.com/security
/online-privacy/home-wireless.aspx (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
22. Id.
23. Id.
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some of one another's computer files when both people are using the
same unsecured wireless network.24
In the alternative, a wireless Internet network can be secured
with a password and encryption.' In this case, people who attempt to
log onto a network must supply a password when they select the
network on their computer.6 When encrypted, even if someone
intercepts the radio transmissions from the network, the information
is not decipherable unless the password is provided or the encryption
used is decoded. 27 Encryption methods vary in difficulty to decode.8
There are currently three main types of encryption: WEP, WAP, and
pre-shared key or WAP2/PSK.29 WEP was the original code and it
can now be readily decoded with software; WAP was the next
development in encryption technology and it is of intermediate
strength; and WAP2/PSK is the strongest and most difficult to
decode.0 Wireless routers usually have encryption turned off by
default, thus the user must take affirmative steps to activate the
encryption and secure the network."
The use of wireless Internet in the Fourth Amendment context is
new ground for the courts in the United States. A brief review of
applicable standards is useful in starting to determine how a court will
analyze the Fourth Amendment protection of information accessed
over secured and unsecured wireless Internet networks.
B. The Fourth Amendment Principles
Government searches of any private property are subject to
various constraints, both constitutional and statutory. The Fourth
Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
24. Ahrndt I, 2010 WL 373994, at *2 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2010).
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probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.32
Thus, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the government from
conducting unreasonable searches and seizures of persons, houses,
papers, and effects." The Fourth Amendment only protects against
searches conducted by the government, not searches by private
citizens."
In Katz v. United States, the government, without a warrant,
recorded conversations of a private citizen in a telephone booth with
a wiretap and sought to introduce the recordings against him at trial.35
The Supreme Court found the wiretapping was unconstitutional and
established a two-pronged test to determine whether a government
search had occurred." The test asks (1) if the government has
violated a person's actual expectation of privacy, and (2) if society
recognizes an expectation of privacy in the area searched as
reasonable.3 ' The answer to both questions of the test must be in the
affirmative for a court to find the government has violated a
reasonable expectation of privacy and conducted a search that
required a warrant." Recently, in United States v. Jones, the Court
articulated an alternative Fourth Amendment test and ruled that a
search occurs when the government physically intrudes upon property
for the purpose of obtaining information."
There are also statutory federal guidelines indicating that stored
communications have a reasonable expectation of privacy under a
Fourth Amendment analysis.40 The Electronic Communications
Privacy Act ("ECPA"), 18 U.S.C. § 2511, is meant to prevent the
unauthorized access of Internet information.4 1 ECPA suggests a
32. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
33. Id.
34. United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
35. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (finding that police violated a
reasonable expectation of privacy when they used a wiretap to eavesdrop on conversations
that took place in a telephone booth).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
38. Id.
39. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(g)(i). See also Ahrndt 1, 2010 WL 373994, at *7 (D. Or. Jan. 28,
2010).
41. Ahrndt I, 2010 WL 373994, at *8.
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reasonable expectation of privacy exists only when the information is
not readily discoverable by the public. 42 The three Ahrndt decisions,
however, demonstrate that these standards lead to confusion and
inconsistency when applied to searches of secured and unsecured
wireless Internet networks.
C. An Application of The Fourth Amendment to Wireless-Internet
Searches: Ahrndt
On January 28, 2010, the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon decided United States v. John Henry Ahrndt
("Ahrndt I")."3 The court used the Katz test to rule that there was no
reasonable expectation of privacy in computer files viewed by police
via a wireless Internet connection to an unsecured router in a private
residence." This was the first decision to directly deal with the
privacy rights of information broadcast over an unsecured wireless
Internet connection.45 In April 2012, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded the decision for further
consideration ("Ahrndt II",).46 In 2013, the district court issued a new
ruling ("Ahrndt III").47 These cases illustrate which factors and tests
are important in determining whether a search of a wireless Internet
network has occurred and in identifying difficulties with Fourth
41Amendment analysis of this issue.
In the Ahrndt cases, a private citizen-a woman referred to as
JH-used her neighbor's unsecured wireless Internet network, and
because no password was required, she used the wireless network by
simply selecting it on her home computer.4 When JH accessed her
iTunes software, she saw images and names of files stored on her
neighbor's computer because it was connected to the same unsecured
wireless network.o Inadvertently, she viewed the names of files that
her neighbor had downloaded and stored on his computer." She
42. Id.
43. Id. at *1.
44. Id. at *3.
45. Duncan Stark, Broadcasting Expectations: An Unprotected Wireless Network
takes on Constitutional Dimensions, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 1, 1 (2011).
46. Ahrndt II, 475 F. App'x 656,658 (9th Cir. 2012).
47. Ahrndt IH1, 2013 WL 179326, at *1 (D. Or. Jan. 17, 2013).
4& See Ahrndt 1, 2010 WL 373994, at *7; Ahrndt II, 475 F. App'x at 656; Ahrndt III,
2013 WL 179326, at *9.
49. Ahrndt 1, 2010 WL 373994, at *1.
50. Id. at *2.
51. Id.
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believed that the titles of the videos indicated that they were child
pornography. JH contacted the police; a police officer came to her
home and used her computer to access the videos in the same way.5
The police initially viewed the videos from JH's computer without a
warrant and subsequently used them at trial.54
In Ahrndt I, the District Court of Oregon applied Katz. It held
that there was no expectation of privacy in the images and, thus, no
search had occurred when the officer viewed the images because they
were broadcasted from an unsecured wireless network." The district
court held that the use of wireless Internet is analogous to the use of
wireless home phones for purposes of Fourth Amendment
protection." Citing the Eighth Circuit's decision in Tyler v. Berodt,
the Ahrndt I court ruled that wireless home phone communications
and wireless Internet communications are similar because they both
operate by broadcasting information through radio waves that are
easily intercepted." In Tyler, the court ruled that wireless phone
communications do not carry a reasonable expectation of privacy
because they are often intercepted when a neighbor on another
wireless home phone inadvertently intercepts a conversation. The
facts in Tyler illustrate this situation, and in the case, an individual's
wireless home phone picked up a neighbor's conversation that
revealed criminal conduct, which the police sought to use at trial. 9
In Ahrndt I, the court ruled that a wireless home phone
communication and an unsecured wireless Internet communication
should be viewed similarly under the law because both operate by
sending information through radio waves that can be intercepted by
common devices.6 The Ahrndt I court also affirmed that wired
Internet connections, like landline phones, should be entitled to
protection under the Fourth Amendment due to the "hard-wired"
nature of the network that makes interception of the communication




55. Id. at *9.
56. Id. at *3-4.
57. Id.
58. Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705, 706 (8th Cir. 1989).
59. Id. at 705.
60. Ahrndt I, 2010 WL 373994, at *4.
61. Id. at *5.
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analysis, the court reasoned that wired Internet communications carry
a reasonable expectation of privacy, but that unsecured wireless
Internet communications often do not carry a reasonable expectation
of privacy.6 2
The Ahrndt I court further held that there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy in unprotected wireless communications that
were shared over iTunes because a person would have to take
affirmative steps to allow for the sharing of his files over a wireless
network." The court noted that in order to share iTunes files over a
wireless connection, a user must complete a several-step process on
his computer. Thus, the user waives his expectation of privacy by
taking those steps and affirmatively allowing others on the same
wireless network to view the information in his iTunes account.6 The
district court relied on the Ninth Circuit decision United States v.
Ganoe.6 1 In Ganoe, a defendant used LimeWire, a free peer-to-peer
file sharing client program that shared files with other computers by
default." The program allowed a user to stop sharing files by taking
affirmative steps, but the defendant failed to take those steps and
shared the files.67 The Ninth Circuit ruled that the files on LimeWire
were in plain view of the Internet-using public and not knowing how
to disable the sharing option was not an excusei6 In Ahrndt I, the
court used this reasoning in a Katz analysis to conclude that, because
the defendant used iTunes and enabled the sharing feature, he
exposed the files to the plain view of Internet users; consequently, he
had no expectation of privacy in the information."
The Ahrndt I court then looked at the application of the
Electronic Communications Protection Act ("ECPA"), 18 U.S.C. §
2511. It held that the Act did not suggest that a reasonable
expectation of privacy existed under a Katz analysis in this electronic
communication.o The court ruled that the ECPA is "intended to
protect against the unauthorized interception of electronic
communications, and to protect stored electronic communications
62. Id.
63. Id. at *6.
64. Id. at *7.
65. United States v. Ganoe, 538 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 2008).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1127.
69. Ahrndt 1, 2010 WL 373994, at *6.
70. Id. at *7.
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and transactional records from unauthorized access .... "" Noting
that the FWA applies only when the information that is accessed is
not readily available to the general public, the court in Ahrndt I ruled
that the information was not protected under the FWA because the
defendant took affirmative steps to allow the general public to be
able to view his information through file sharing.72
In Ahrndt II, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the
Ahrndt I decision for further consideration. The Ninth Circuit posed
three questions to the district court, and asked the court to analyze
the case under the newly decided United States v. Jones.74 First, the
court of appeals asked whether sharing files over a wireless
connection would be accurately depicted as a "broadcast" of
information, or whether the act of accessing files on the defendant's
computer involved sending wireless signals into his home to
communicate with his router and his computer." Second, the court
inquired into whether defendant intentionally enabled sharing of the
files on his computer-or, in the event that he did not-whether he
knew or should have known that others could access his files by
logging onto his wireless network." Third, the court asked whether
the image that JH and the police officer accessed was openly available
to Internet users at the time the police accessed it or at anytime
before the police accessed it."
On remand, in Ahrndt III, the district court reversed the Ahrndt
I ruling and held that a Fourth Amendment search had occurred and
that it was unconstitutional. 8  The court noted that it had
misunderstood the computer software used by the defendant and had
concluded, without evidence, that he had affirmatively allowed
sharing of files over his unsecured wireless network.7 9 Combined with
the fact that JH had never viewed the videos she came across, the
videos were excluded from trial and the charges against Ahrndt were
dismissed.o
71. Id. at *6.
72. Id.
73. Ahrdnt II, 475 F. App'x 656, 658 (9th Cir. 2012).
74. Id.; United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 945 (2012).
75. Ahrndt II, 475 F. App'x at 658.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Ahrndt III, 2013 WL 179326, at *7.
79. Id. at *6.
80. Id. at *10.
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By analyzing the three Ahrndt decisions, an observer can begin
to identify how a court would approach a Fourth Amendment
question involving the search of a wireless network. Applying Katz,
the three Ahrndt courts had to determine how a wireless Internet
connection works, how the software that allowed access to the file
actually operated, and what steps (if any) a software user must take to
allow third parties access to his files. The Katz analysis led to
confusion in the district court when it misunderstood how iTunes
operated, and that misunderstanding was later the basis of the Ninth
Circuit reversing the decision. However, the Ninth Circuit also
suggested that a Jones analysis should have been considered by the
district court. Would a Jones analysis be a more appropriate standard
in wireless Internet cases?
II. Analysis
A. The Jones Rule Applied to a Wireless Internet Search
The first question the Ninth Circuit asked was whether wireless
Internet is accurately depicted as a "broadcast" of information, or
whether the act of accessing files on the defendant's computer
involved sending wireless signals into his home to communicate with
his router and his computer." As noted, wireless Internet operates by
sending radio signals from a router to a computer, thereby replacing
the need for wired Internet.2 In that way, a wireless router sends
information similarly to how a radio or wireless home phone
"broadcasts" information to the public. However, some courts have
also recognized that others may access a wireless Internet user's
computer when they send a signal to the computer, and a physical
invasion can occur based on that access." This view undermines the
idea that the wireless Internet is "broadcast" because it must be
"reached out and taken" from the wireless router.8 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court recently ruled in Jones that when the government
physically invades property for the purpose of obtaining information,
81. Ahrndt II, 475 F. App'x 656, 658 (9th Cir. 2012).
82. See generally, A Brief History of Wi-Fi, supra note 15.
83. See Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Disc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1259, 1277
(N.D. Iowa 2000); Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451-52 (E.D. Va. 1998);
Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550-51 (E.D. Va. 1998); CompuServe, Inc. v.
Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021-22 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Hotmail Corp. v.
Van$ Money Pie, Inc., No. C 98-20064 JW, 1998 WL 388389, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16,
1998).
84. Id.
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a search has occurred." Thus, a wireless Internet router could be
viewed as an object, rather than a broadcasting device, which must be
"reached out to" and intentionally contacted in order to gather
information.
1. The Problem with "Physical Invasion" in Wireless Internet Searches
A number of district courts have ruled that communicating with
a computer through the Internet can constitute a physical contact.8
The Supreme Court held in Jones that a search occurs when the
government physically makes contact with "private property for the
purpose of obtaining information."a When using the wireless
Internet, physical contact may seem intuitively impossible since the
connection is not physically wired." However, the assertion that
physical contact occurs when a computer sends electronic signals to a
wireless router is supported by recent decisions, including numerous
federal court decisions regarding unsolicited mass emails."
The first decision to hold that physical contact occurs when a
computer sends electronic information to a wireless router was
CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.0 In CompuServe, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held
that the electronic signals that the defendant's computer had
generated in order to send an email over the Internet resulted in a
physical contact.9' After the CompuServe decision, the ruling was
regularly cited in cases involving mass emails, and the proposition
that a physical contact is possible over the Internet is now an oft cited
85. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
86. See Nat'l Health Care Disc., 121 F. Supp. 2d at 1259, 1277; LCGM, 46 F. Supp. 2d
at 451-52; IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 550-51; CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1021-22; Hotmail,
1998 WL 388389, at *7.
87. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 cmt. e (1965) (requiring physical
contact for trespassory intermeddling); Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New
Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REv. 801, 830
(2003) (stating that a trespass argument requires that the electronic signal be viewed as
physical contact).
89. See Nat'l Health Care Disc., 121 F. Supp. 2d at 1259, 1277; LCGM, 46 F. Supp. 2d
at 451-52; IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 550-51; CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1021-22; Hotmail,
1998 WL 388389, at *7.
89. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
90. CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1015.
91. Id. at 1021.
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principle.' Indeed, the proposition was affirmed by the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in America Online,
Inc. v. LCGM, in which the court held that "the transmission of
electronic signals through a computer network is sufficient to
constitute a physical contact.""
Furthermore, the line of cases establishing that a physical contact
occurs in mass-email cases was extended to cases where someone
used software to collect data from other websites. In eBay, Inc. v.
Bidder's Edge, Inc., the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California extended the principle of physical contact
through the Internet to the situation where individuals use software
to extract information from another's website." The court ruled that
electronic signals sent by Bidder's Edge to retrieve information from
eBay's server were sufficient to constitute a physical contact for
trespass."
These cases adopt the idea that electronic signals sent to a
computer constitute a legal physical contact." Applying this principle
to the Jones analysis for a search, it is possible for a search to occur
when the government accesses an individual's information over a
wireless Internet connection.8 Electronic signals are sent to a router
when someone accesses the Internet through that router.? This
means that a physical contact occurs when the police access and use a
defendant's router under a Jones analysis.'" Furthermore, if police
access the wireless connection "for the purpose of obtaining
information" from the defendant, then a search occurs under Jones.'0 '
The Ninth Circuit suggested that it was open to entertaining a similar
92. See eBay Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069-72 (N.D. Cal. 2000);
IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 55051; CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1021-22; Hotmail, 1998 WL
388389, at *7.
93. LCGM, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 452 (citing CompuServe, Inc., 962 F. Supp. at 1021).
94. Bidder's Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1058.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1069.
97. See Bidder's Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1069-72; Nat'l Health Care Disc., 121 F.
Supp. 2d at 1259, 1277; LCGM, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 451-52; IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 550-51;
CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1021-22; Hotmail, 1998 WL 388389, at *7.
97. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
98. Id.
99. See Bradley Mitchell, Wireless Product Equipments-Network Routers, Access
Points, Adapters and More, ABouT.COM, http://compnetworking.about.com/od/wireless/ss
/wirelessgear.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
100. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
101. Id.
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argument in Ahrndt, and it tasked the lower court with further fact-
finding to determine whether the police had sent any signals to the
defendant's router, and whether a search occurred under Jones.'02
There are also criticisms, however, of the "physical-contact-through-
the-Internet" theory that should be acknowledged-and it should be
noted that this theory has not yet been applied in criminal cases."
2. The Rebuttal to the "Physical-Contact-through-the-Internet"
Argument
The view that a physical contact occurs when electronic signals
are sent through the Internet has been rebutted.'" Traditional
conceptions of physical contact are at odds with the idea that a
physical contact occurs when electronic signals are sent through the
Internet.10 ' Furthermore, courts have ruled that cordless telephone
broadcasts of radio signals that may be intercepted by police for
information are not subject to Fourth Amendment protection." This
suggests that other forms of intercepted radio communication have
not historically had a reasonable expectation of privacy.
It has also been argued that if physical contact can be established
through electronic signal transmission over the Internet, this theory
opens the door for preposterous causes of action." For example, the
inadvertent dialing of a wrong number on a phone may support a
trespass claim because a physical contact has technically occurred."o
However, this logic is inapplicable to the Jones analysis because for a
search to occur, the physical contact must be accompanied by police
action performed "for the purpose of obtaining information.'"10
Moreover, the physical-contact-through-the-Internet principle
has not yet been applied to a physical trespass argument under a
102. Ahrndt II, 475 F. App'x 656, 658 (9th Cir. 2012) (asking whether connecting to
the defendant's network and accessing his files "involve[d] sending wireless signals into
the defendant's home to communicate with his router and computer").
103. Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 27, 32
(2000) (expressing concerns over applications of this cyberspace theory to common law
trespass claims).
104. See generally id.
105. Id. at 32-33.
106. In Re Askin, 47 F.3d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d
171, 178-81 (5th Cir. 1992).
107. Burk, supra note 102, at 34.
108. Id.
109. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
Jones analysis."o Indeed, there is disagreement over whether a
physical contact is even possible through the Internet."' However,
the Ninth Circuit's question on remand to the district court in Ahrndt
I, asking whether the police sent a signal to the defendant's router,
suggests that the court may be open to an argument of physical
trespass in similar wireless Internet cases under Jones.n2 The Jones
test would provide consistency and credibility to decisions regarding
wireless Internet searches if the physical trespass through the Internet
argument is adopted in criminal cases. If accessing a wireless router
were to be accepted as a physical contact, then the only remaining
questions are: (1) whether it occurred in a constitutionally protected
area; and (2) whether the police were attempting to obtain
information. This would bypass the court's current need to accurately
analyze the specific computer software and security of the wireless
router in every case, as required under Katz.
B. The Katz Analysis in Wireless Internet Networks
The Ninth Circuit also asked whether the manner in which the
information was stored on the computer would give rise to a
reasonable expectation of privacy in that information under a Katz
analysis."' To determine this, the district court asked whether Ahrndt
had intentionally enabled sharing of files on his computer or whether
he knew or should have known that the files on his computer could be
viewed by others using his wireless Internet.H4 Under Katz, a search
occurs when a person has a subjective expectation of privacy in an
area searched and society is prepared to recognize that expectation as
objectively reasonable."' In a Katz analysis, a finding that a person
knew or should have known his files were public would suggest he
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the files.
To determine whether an individual knew or should have known
his computer files were public under a Katz analysis of a wireless
Internet search, the court must take a case-by-case approach and
examine the specific computer software used in each case. The
Ahrndt I court found that iTunes software would only share
information if a user affirmatively chose to allow sharing through a
110. Id.
111. See generally Burk, supra note 102.
112. Ahrndt II, 475 F. App'x 656, 658 (9th Cir. 2012); Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
113. Ahrndt II, 475 F. App'x at 658.
114. Id.
115. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
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multi-step process."' Based on this, the court reasoned that Ahrndt
had no expectation of privacy because he had selected to share his
computer files."
While the logic sounded convincing, the Ninth Circuit noted that
the analysis was factually flawed because it misunderstood the iTunes
software that was used in the case.' The record only supported that
JH had viewed the files on her personal iTunes software that was
installed on her computer.119 Just because a user can view files on
their own iTunes does not mean that the files they are viewing
originated from another iTunes program.12 ' This is because iTunes
allows a user to view music that is downloaded by other software like
LimeWire.12' Thus, the assumption that Ahrndt had iTunes on his
computer and had to affirmatively allow sharing of his files was
unsubstantiated by any evidence and was based on the lower court's
misconception of how iTunes worked.
The treachery of a Katz inquiry into a wireless Internet search is
demonstrated by the Ahrndt court's misunderstanding of the
computer software.122 This misunderstanding illustrates the
difficulties and inconsistencies that the courts will encounter in a Katz
analysis of wireless Internet searches.'23 For an example of a court's
software-specific analysis under the Katz test, this Note will examine
the effect of peer-to-peer software on reasonable expectations to
privacy.
C. A Katz Analysis Applied to Peer-to-Peer Software Searches
The Ninth Circuit asked whether the defendant's computer files
were accessible to others over the Internet, since he was using a peer-
to-peer file sharing program. 24 This suggests that, under a Katz
analysis, the court may be willing to accept the proposition that
people who share files stored on peer-to-peer software have no
116. Ahrndt I, 2010 WL 373994, at *6 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2010).
117. Id.
118. Ahrndt II, 475 F. App'x at 658.
119. Id.
120. iTunes: How to Share Music and Video, http://support.apple.com/kblHT2688 (last
visited Mar. 24, 2013).
121. Id.
122. Ahrndt II, 475 F. App'x at 658.
123. See generally Ahrndt I, 2010 WL 373994 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2010); Ahrndt II, 475 F.
App'x 656 (9th Cir. 2012).
124. Ahrndt II, 475 F. App'x at 658.
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reasonable expectation of privacy. Peer-to-peer networks are special
networks that link computers through the Internet and allow people
who download software to access files on all computers that have also
downloaded the necessary software.125 In United States v. Stanley, the
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania took the view
that people have no reasonable expectation of privacy in information
stored on peer-to-peer software.126 In Stanley, the defendant had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in files that are stored on peer-to-
peer software because the files are readily available to the public.'27
Similarly, the court in Ahrndt noted that where a file is saved on a
peer-to-peer network, it will likely extinguish any reasonable
expectation of privacy in the files since they are readily available to
other computer users.128
As an aside, it should be noted that the Stanley court also dealt
with the police tracking a wireless Internet signal in order to find the
location of a home.129 The court ruled that no search had occurred
when the police utilized a device to learn the origin of a wireless
Internet signal." The court relied on Smith v. Maryland and ruled
that any information voluntarily turned over to a third party-here,
the broadcasting of information about a router to the Internet service
provider-meant that the information was not protected by the
Fourth Amendment."' This doctrine, known as the third-party
doctrine, likely applies when the police intercept a wireless Internet
signal only to obtain the origin of the signal.'32
Furthermore, the court in Stanley applied Kyllo v. United States,
which is a case that introduced a Katz-like test that may be valuable
when used in a wireless Internet search analysis."' The Kyllo test
states that a search occurs when the police use a sense-enhancing
technology not in common use to learn the inner details of the home,
125. United States v. Stanley, No. 11-272, 2012 WL 5512987, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 14,
2012).
126. Id. at *14.
127. Id. at *11.
128. Ahrndt I, 2010 WL 373994, at *5.
129. Stanley, 2012 WL 5512987, at *14.
130. Id.
131. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979); Stanley, 2012 WL 5512987, at *14.
132. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-44 (1976);
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745,
752 (1971) (plurality opinion); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
133. Stanley, 2012 WL 5512987, at *14.
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which would not otherwise be knowable without physical trespass.
In a case where police use a device to obtain computer files from
inside of a home-in Stanley the police used a tracking device called
Moocherhunter to determine an IP address-the Kyllo test may be
applicable.135 However, when the police use a home computer-as
was the case in Ahrndt-the Kyllo test will not be useful because the
computer will likely be viewed as a device that is in common use.'
Thus, under a Katz analysis, it is important to identify if the
information that is obtained through a wireless Internet connection is
stored on peer-to-peer software because this information likely does
not carry a reasonable expectation of privacy under a Katz analysis.'
It may also be harder to prove that a reasonable expectation of
privacy existed when the police only obtain information about the
location of a router's signal through the third party doctrine.13
Furthermore, the Kyllo test should be applied if the police use a
device that is not in common use to obtain computer files from a
network that is inside of a home.'39 In the Katz analysis, all of these
inquiries will be necessary and relevant in determining whether a
reasonable expectation of privacy exists in a wireless Internet search.
However, the issue will become even more complicated for a court
when it has to confront the issue of whether securing a wireless
Internet network creates a reasonable expectation of privacy under
Katz.
D. Katz Analysis and the Effect of a Secured Wireless Internet
Network
Thus far, this Note has focused on whether a search occurs when
the police access an unencrypted wireless network. How might these
principles apply to an encrypted wireless network? It should not be
assumed that encrypting a wireless Internet connection will grant
Fourth Amendment protection to files accessed through the network.
Wireless Internet encryption is an affirmative step that the owner
of a router may undergo if they want (and know how) to do so."
134. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
135. Stanley, 2012 WL 5512987, at *14.
136. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
137. See generally Ahrndt I, 2010 WL 373994 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2010); Ahrndt II, 475 F.
App'x 656 (9th Cir. 2012); Stanley, 2012 WL 5512987.
138. See generally Stanley, 2012 WL 5512987.
139. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
140. HELP DESK GEEK, supra note 25.
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Once a user has encrypted a wireless network, the information is then
sent out on radio waves in a coded format that cannot be deciphered
unless someone can decode the information."' However, as decoding
the information has become easier with advancing technology,
encryption methods have become more sophisticated as old code
systems have been cracked. 142 At first glance, activating encryption
may seem to be an affirmative step that the user takes to retain a
reasonable expectation of privacy under a Katz analysis.143 If the
court views encryption as "sealing the information in a locked case,"
encryption may strengthen the argument for a reasonable expectation
of privacy on the information broadcasted on a wireless Internet
network.'" In the alternative, the court may view the encryption as
"enOcoding a message" and sending it with the hope that someone
will not capture and decode the message.45 If this was the case,
encryption would not strengthen the argument for a reasonable
expectation of privacy. This Note will now explore these two
possible, and conflicting, interpretations.
1. Characterizing a Secure Network as an Encoded Message
Generally, courts have ruled that a message is not protected by
the Fourth Amendment simply because it is encoded.'" Although no
court has addressed whether wireless Internet encryption should
receive Fourth Amendment protection, a number of courts have
addressed the effect of concealing a message by making it
indecipherable to police. 47 In United States v. Scott,'" United States v.
Longoria,'149 and Commonwealth v. Copenhefer,' the court has
consistently held that the Fourth Amendment does not protect
messages with a hidden meaning.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See Ahrndt 1, 2010 WL 373994, at *4 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2010).
144. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 821 (1982); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock
Sch. Dist., 380 F.3d 349, 356 (8th Cir. 2004).
145. See generally United States v. Scott, 975 F.2d 927 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v.
Longoria, 177 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 1999); Pennsylvania v. Copenhefer, 587 A.2d 1353 (Pa.





149. Longoria, 177 F.3d at 1179.
150. Copenhefer, 587 A.2d at 1533.
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In Scott, the court retrieved shredded documents that contained
evidence of tax evasion from the defendant's trash."' Over a number
of days, the police reassembled the documents and were able to
obtain information from the papers.152 The court held that no warrant
was required to seize the shredded documents because the documents
were available to the public and "the Fourth Amendment does not
protect a defendant when a third party expends money and effort to
solve a jigsaw puzzle." 153
In Longoria, defendants "encoded" their conversation by
speaking in a foreign language in front of English-speaking police.154
However, the police secretly recorded the conversation and had it
translated.' The defendants argued that the police needed a warrant
since the conversations were purposefully encoded, and thus carried a
reasonable expectation of privacy."' The court disagreed, and ruled
that a defendant's hope that society would not understand his
communication was not reasonable under Katz.'
In Copenhefer, the police searched the home computer of a
suspected kidnapping and murder suspect.' With a warrant to search
the home computer, the police recovered a number of ransom
notes."' The defendant had attempted to delete the messages from
the computer prior to the police search, so no one could read them."
The police were able to "undelete" the files using special software.161
The court ruled that no warrant was needed to "undelete" the files
because "a mere hope of secrecy is not a legally protected expectation
[of privacy]."162
Furthermore, the encryption of messages is not a new concept.163
During the American Revolutionary War there were many examples
151. Scott, 975 F.2d at 928.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 930.
154. Longoria, 177 F.3d at 1181.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1182.
157. Id. at 1183.
158. Pennsylvania v. Copenhefer, 587 A.2d 1353, 1355 (Pa. 1991).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1356.
162. Id.
163. See generally Jennifer Wilcox, Revolutionary Secrets: Secret Communications of
the American Revolution (2005), http://www.nsa.gov/about/ files/cryptologic-heritage/
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of the use of encryption for secret messages.'" In fact, the decryption
of British messages gave George Washington the confidence he
needed to storm and capture Yorktown in 1781.' George
Washington also exiled the Chief Physician of the Constitutional
Army based on a decoded message suggesting the physician was a
spy.'" Furthermore, the trial of Aaron Burr in 1807 revolved around
an encoded letter that the Supreme Court ordered Burr's assistant to
decipher."' Thus, the Framers likely understood and contemplated
examples of the encoded message when they drafted the Fourth
Amendment.8
These examples suggest that "encoding" a message was familiar
to the founders of our country and of some relevance at the time.' 9
Thus, the Framers likely considered encoded messages as
unprotected by the Fourth Amendment as evidenced by the
prevalence of the messages in history and in early court cases in the
United States. Furthermore, common law supports the proposition
that encoded messages are not protected by the Fourth Amendment
if they are available to the public and are decoded by police.o
Therefore, if the courts view wireless Internet encryption as a system
that encodes a message broadcasted to the public by a router, it is
likely that even encrypted wireless Internet communications will not
be protected by the Fourth Amendment.
2. Characterizing a Secured Network as a Message Sealed in a Container
Federal courts have also generally ruled that the Fourth
Amendment protects messages that are in a locked container."' Most
recently in United States v. Jacobsen and in United States v. Ross, the
Supreme Court held that this protection extends specifically to
publications/prewii/revolutionary-secrets.pdf (noting many examples of the use of coded
messages during the American Revolutionary War).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1.
166. Id. at 4.
167. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 38, 40 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
168. See generally Wilcox, supra note 162.
169. Id.
170. United States v. Longoria, 177 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Scott, 975 F.2d 927, 930 (1st Cir. 1992); Pennsylvania v. Copenhefer, 587 A.2d 1353, 1356
(Pa. 1991), abrogated on different grounds by Pennsylvania v. Rizzuto, 777 A.2d 1069 (Pa.
2001).
171. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984); United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 800 (1982); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 380 F.3d 349, 354 (8th Cir.
2004).
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envelopes and sealed packages.7 2 In Jacobsen and Ross, the Court
held that searches of envelopes and sealed containers are
presumptively unreasonable, and that society has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in effects contained therein."'
In Jacobsen and Ross, the Court reaffirmed the notion that a
sealed envelope or package is protected under the Fourth
Amendment.14 However, in both of these cases, the Court found
there were exceptions to that rule."' In Jacobsen, the Court ruled
that the contents of a sealed container, that had broken open, had no
reasonable expectation of privacy because the contents were exposed
to the outside world."' In Ross, the Court ruled that the police legally
opened a sealed package inside of a vehicle because the vehicle was
lawfully stopped and they had probable cause to believe that
contraband was inside the package."' In the absence of narrow
exceptions like these, the protection of the contents of sealed letters
and packages render any warrantless search of their contents
unreasonable."'
Internet communication may be seen as the modern replacement
for the postal service in many ways and commentators have
speculated that it will someday replace the post office."'7 If courts
view wireless Internet encryption as a package that encapsulates a
message, then they are likely to extend Fourth Amendment
protection to wireless Internet communications. In this way, society
would expect the same privacy in wireless Internet communications
that they would expect in physical mail sent through the postal
service. However, there are many differences between mail and
wireless Internet communications These differences may be roughly
illustrated by a "lock-and-key" analogy.
Wireless Internet encryption can be viewed as a lock with the
password to decode the network." The Fourth Amendment has long
172. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 114.
173. Id.
174. Id.; Ross, 456 U.S. at 800.
175. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 109; Ross, 456 U.S. at 798.
176. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 120-24.
177. Ross, 456 U.S. at 800.
178. See generally Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 109; Ross, 456 U.S. at 798.
179. Susanna Kim, Do We Need the Postal Service?, ABC NEWS CONSUMER REPORT
(Sept. 6, 2011, 1:07pm), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/business/2011/09/do-we-need-the-
postal-servicel.
180. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption Create A
"Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?, " 33 CONN. L. REV. 503, 504 (2001).
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protected locked packages-and mail has been viewed as belonging
to this category.'1 However, it is inconsistent to extend the lock-and-
key analogy to Internet encryption because it relies on the
justification that a locked message is protected since an outsider
cannot see the message.82 An encrypted wireless Internet
transmission can be viewed, although the information is in an
unreadable form known as "ciphertext," and can only be read if it is
decoded.' Thus, practically, the question is whether a person can
decipher the message-not whether he can see that the information is
hidden from sight by a barrier.'" This distinction makes it possible to
argue that the lock-and-key analogy should not be extended to
wireless encryption because the wireless encryption functions more
like a code than a sealed envelope or a lock and key.' The effect
that securing a wireless Internet network will have on a reasonable
expectation of privacy under a Katz test is unclear. The coded
message and the sealed envelope characterizations demonstrate the
difficulty a court may have in analyzing the effects of securing a
wireless network. Thus, even the assumption that securing a wireless
network will give a person's computer files a reasonable expectation
of privacy under a Katz analysis may not prove to be true.
III. Proposal: Selecting the Sensible Test for Wireless Internet
Searches
It is inevitable that courts will face the issues outlined in this
Note because wireless Internet has become ubiquitous in modern
society.'" If the courts apply a Katz test to wireless Internet searches,
the analysis will be painstaking and the inconsistency in decisions will
be great. First, under Katz, a court must determine how the
particular computer software in the case functions.'" This would
require a court to understand every new program in the ever-
developing world of computer software. The reversal of the district
court's decision in Ahrndt I demonstrates how ineffective this
181. Id.
182. Id. at 522.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 523.
185. Id. at 522.
186. See A Brief History of Wi-Fi, supra note 15.
187. See generally Ahrndt 1, 2010 WL 373994 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2010); Ahrndt II, 475 F.
App'x 656 (9th Cir. 2012); Ahrndt III, 2013 WL 179326 (D. Or. Jan. 17, 2013).
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approach could be.'" Second, under Katz, if the wireless network
were secured, a court would face the challenge of how to characterize
the encryption. Information on a secure wireless Internet network
may either be viewed as being a coded message or as being a locked
container under common law."' As one commentator has noted,
selecting the appropriate characterization will largely depend on a
court's views of how encryption functions.'" If a court looks at how
encryption technically functions, then securing a network may be
viewed as a way to encrypt a message and may be no reasonable
expectation of privacy even in secured wireless Internet networks. 9'
If a court views securing a network through the lens of societal
expectations, then it will likely view securing a network as analogous
to a sealing an envelope for a letter; accordingly, a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a secured wireless Internet network will be
found." Thus, every court would be left to delve into the technical
function of computer software and make determinations on how
encryption affects a reasonable expectation of privacy.
On the other hand, Jones presents an alternative to the Katz
analysis. A Jones analysis would ask whether the police physically
invaded a protected area for the purpose of obtaining information."
In the wireless Internet context, the police would have sent a signal
that contacted the router. Note that the premise of a contact
occurring through the Internet will have to be adopted in criminal
courts for the Jones test to be relevant.94 Once a physical contact is
established, a court must ask: (1) whether the router and the network
were in a constitutionally protected area; and (2) whether a
reasonable person would think that the police were attempting to
obtain information by the contact. In Ahrndt, the court ruled that a
Fourth Amendment search occurred because the police contacted the
router when accessing the network through JH's computer. The
188. Ahrndt I, 2010 WL 373994, at *6.
189. Kerr, supra note 179, at 522.
190. Id. at 523.
191. Id. at 532.
192. Id.
193. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
194. See Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Disc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1259, 1277
(N.D. Iowa 2000); Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, 46 F. Supp. 2d 444,451-52 (E.D. Va. 1998);
Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550-51 (E.D. Va. 1998); CompuServe, Inc. v.
Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021-22 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Hotmail Corp. v.
Van$ Money Pie, Inc., No. C-98 JW PVT ENE, C 98-20064 JW, 1998 WL 388389, at *7
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998).
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router was in the home-the most constitutionally protected area.195
A reasonable person would think that the police intended to obtain
information, evidenced by the police coming to JH's home in order to
use her computer to access files for an investigation." Thus, in
Ahrndt, the police should have known that they needed a warrant. In
addition, all citizens would retain an expectation of privacy in
computer files within their homes unless the police could point to
articulable facts that suggested that unlawful activity is occurring on
the network.197
Unlike a Katz analysis that requires a court to intricately
understand society's privacy expectation based on how every piece of
computer software is designed, a Jones analysis would focus on the
protections of the location of the router and wireless network. This
would allow the court to enforce Fourth Amendment protection in
areas where people expect to be free from government intrusion, like
the home.'9 For wireless Internet searches, the Jones test would
result in a "brighter line" and more consistent results than a Katz
analysis. One must consider the disparity in rulings if courts were to
apply to the Katz test to all future cases involving wireless Internet
searches based on the issues brought up in this Note alone. A bright
line Jones analysis in this area will allow the police to conduct
investigations while complying with the Fourth Amendment. It will
allow the police to have confidence that their investigations and
convictions will be upheld. Furthermore, it will allow citizens to be
free from governmental intrusion in the locations where privacy is
commonly expected. For these reasons, the application of the Jones
test to wireless Internet searches will lead to the most consistent and
just future jurisprudence in this area.
Conclusion
The courts have begun to create precedent for cases where the
police intercept information over a wireless Internet connection. A
search can occur in two ways. First, under Katz, a search occurs when
a defendant has a subjective expectation of privacy in an area
195. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) ("At the very core stands the
right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion.").
196. Ahrndt III, 2013 WL 179326, at *10 (D. Or. Jan. 17, 2013).
197. Susan W. Brenner, The Fourth Amendment in an Era of Ubiquitous Technology,
75 Miss. L.J. 1, 63 (2005).
198. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511.
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searched and society recognizes that expectation as reasonable.'" For
a wireless Internet search under the Katz analysis, courts must
understand how the software technically stores the file that the police
accessed. Furthermore, courts must determine how much weight is
given to the fact that the network was secure or unsecure.
Alternatively, a search occurs under Jones when the police physically
invade a protected area for the purpose of obtaining information.2
The Jones test should be the test courts utilize when analyzing a
search of a wireless Internet network. This is because the court can
focus on what matters: the constitutional protection of the area that
contains the wireless network. This analysis more accurately reflects
society's expectation of privacy, compared to the Katz analysis, which
examines society's expectations of privacy based on its understanding
of computer software. The understanding of software varies from
person to person, while privacy in the home is generally understood
by all. Thus, the Jones analysis will offer a more precise and
predictable test when applied to wireless Internet searches. For this
reason, the Jones test should be considered the first choice of courts
in wireless Internet search cases. For this reason, the Jones test
should be the test utilized by courts in wireless Internet search cases.
199. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
200. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
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